studies.
The current paper addresses the issue of whether motor voter, mail-in and agency programs benefit the Democrats at the expense of the Republicans. Demographic disparities between voters and non-voters lead to the conventional wisdom that motor voter programs --or any other program to increase turnout --will benefit Democrats relative to Republicans. Petrocik and Shaw (1991) report that nonvoters are younger, less-educated, poorer, and disproportionately black, characteristics associated with support for the Democratic party. Because blacks and the poor tend to be over-represented among the population that does not register and does not vote, and because these groups overwhelmingly identify with Democrats and not Republicans, liberalizing registration will disproportionately increase votes for Democratic candidates, by this reasoning 4 .
Congressional voting on NVRA is consistent with this view that Democrats have more to gain than Republicans from motor voter. In both 1992 and 1993, more than 80 percent of House
Republicans voted against the NVRA; in contrast, in both years more than 90 percent of House Democrats voted for the measure. A Republican President vetoed the 1992 bill, while a Democratic President signed it into law in 1993. Republicans held the Governor's office in all seven states that refused to implement NVRA until early 1996, following unsuccessful challenges in the courts. While ideological differences regarding the appropriate role of the federal government likely account in part for the partisan split over NVRA, perceptions that new voters will tend to be Democratic undoubtedly heavily influenced the debate:
My colleagues on the left-hand side of this Chamber say they are trying to help the process...maybe I am cynical, I think they are trying to help themselves... Rep. John Linder (R-GA), who introduced a bill to end implementation of NVRA until federal money is appropriated to pay for it, charged that the Democrats' passage of NVRA indicates "they will bend public policy to help them no matter what it takes" (Greenblatt, 1996) . From the other side of the aisle, Ronald Coleman (D-Texas) argued:
...it is a fact of political life in the United States that Republicans and the Republican party in general benefit from low voter turnout....let us not be persuaded by the self-serving objections of Republicans who have traditionally prospered by depressed voter turnout, particularly in black and Hispanic communities, and who see no profit in changing that situation. It smacks of fear...
Piven and Cloward, the founders of the 100% Vote project of Human SERVE, predicted in a New York Times editorial (June 17, 1992 ) that with passage of the bill "registration would rise dramatically among the poor and minorities, who tend to vote Democratic." Based on reports from states newly implementing NVRA's provisions in 1995, Earle (1995, p. 26) 
agreed with
Senator Gramm and with Piven and Cloward, at least with respect to the agency-registration provisions of NVRA:
There is one clear area of potential Democratic advantage: About 8 percent of new registrations are taking place in public assistance agencies. In a handful of states, more people are being registered through these agencies than in motor vehicle departments (although these numbers may be inflated due to duplicate registrations)... "Possible increased registration of low-income and minority people," predicts Frank Parker, a law professor at the District of Columbia School of Law, "could help the Democrats gain one or both houses in Congress, or President Clinton's reelection".
Occasional challenges have arisen to this conventional wisdom regarding the benefit to Democrats of easing registration. In supporting an earlier version of NVRA, then-Minority Whip Newt Gingrich cited polling data indicating motor voter registration would benefit Republicans, because unregistered voters with driver's licenses tended to be disproportionately young, white, suburban persons who move frequently. Then-House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt concurred with Gingrich, saying the bill "is most likely to register Republicans" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 5, 1990) . Similarly, George Will (Atlanta Constitution, June 18, 1992) criticized President Bush for his 1992 veto, writing that "Mr. Bush may be mired in old notions that suggest Republicans would be hurt by increased voting." A recent non-statistical analysis of registration trends, titled "Motor Trouble for Democrats," also questions the conventional wisdom:
It is becoming clear that [Republicans] are fighting a law that promises, in many regions of the country, to do their party more good than harm...
Registration is rising fastest in the South, where Republican momentum was greatest last fall. And it is producing a new crop of independents--many of them in areas where Democrats might have expected to reap motor voter dividends (Earle, 1995, p. 25) .
PREVIOUS EVIDENCE ON PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION REFORM
The empirical literature within political science provides little support for the conventional wisdom that registration reform will help the Democrats. Gaps in party identification between voters and non-voters, or, more to the point, between registrants and nonregistrants, are not as wide as popularly believed. Table 1 details the modest differences in partisan identification and ideology between self-reported registrants and nonregistrants in the 1992 American National Election Study (NES). There is a statistically significant relationship between the partisanship scale and registration status (χ 2 = 62.5, ρ = .001 for 2-tailed test), but the registration increases associated with stronger Republican identification are very small. The most notable difference is not that nonregistrants tend to be more Democratic, but that they are more independent. Among nonregistrants, 18 percent indicated no party preference, compared to only 10.3 percent of registrants. Strong Democrats outnumbered strong Republicans nearly two to one among nonregistrants (9.4 percent to 5.1 percent), but the edge was nearly as great among registrants (19.9 percent to 12.7 percent). The relationship between ideology and registration status is even weaker and statistically insignificant (χ 2 = 6.3, ρ = .39 for 2-tailed test).
Even where differences do exist between participants and nonparticipants, very large increases in turnout would be necessary to change electoral outcomes. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, pp. 82-83) conclude that an expanded voting population produced by relaxing registration requirements would look very much like the current pool of voters: they would be "marginally less educated, poorer, blacker, and younger" but with a virtually unchanged partisan breakdown. Teixeira's (1992) analysis of more recent data leads him to conclude that "changing the result of an election by expanding the voting pool is far more difficult than is generally believed."
He shows that the pool of nonvoters, "while not a faithful representation of the entire population, is hardly a monolith of the disadvantaged" and that "partisan skews by demographic group...are not overwhelming." He also finds that nonvoters are particularly likely to disregard partisan and other preferences and tend to prefer the candidate who appears to be winning. Cavanagh (1990) demonstrates using simple arithmetic illustrations, and historical evidence from U.S. elections, how the effect on electoral outcomes of mobilizing new voters is usually dwarfed by shifts in the preferences of "habitual" or previous voters.
Several studies (e.g., Radcliff, 1995; Erikson, 1995) have addressed this issue by analyzing past elections to determine whether higher turnouts --however generated --tend to be associated with greater success by Democratic candidates. Conclusions from these analyses are sharply contradictory, however. Moreover, the particular mechanisms by which higher turnouts are generated should influence which, if either, party benefits, a point largely ignored in that literature.
This paper examines whether state programs which NVRA provisions are modeled after disproportionately registered Democrats, Republicans, or "independents" (defined here as all registrants who decline to affiliate with either of the two major parties). Few empirical studies of the partisan impact of these provisions have been attempted. Controlling for historical voting patterns and using state-level data for 1992, Franklin and Grier (1997) 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study uses states in each election year over the period 1976-94 as the unit of analysis 5 . Pooled time-series cross-section models with state and year dummy variables are employed, as in Rhine (1995) and Knack (1995) . These "least-squares dummy variables"
(LSDV) or "fixed effects" models eliminate the omitted-variables bias inherent in models which employ either cross-sectional analyses of single years, or in pooled models without dummy variables. Including state and year dummies also eliminates the most important potential sources of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, as explained in Stimson (1985) and Knack (1995) .
A disadvantage of LSDV is the reduction in degrees of freedom from the inclusion of state and year dummies, making it somewhat more difficult to reject null hypotheses. A second disadvantage is attenuation of variance in the independent and dependent variables, as between-state variance is captured by the state dummies. This effect will make it more difficult to reject null hypotheses for independent variables which change very little over time during our sample period 6 . Similarly, if the dependent variable changes little over time, it will be difficult to reject null hypotheses for any of the independent variables. In our analysis, these disadvantages are not severe: we have a large number of degrees of freedom remaining even with the state and year dummies, and there is quite a bit of variation over time in the independent variables of interest (motor voter, in particular) as well as in the dependent variables 7 .
Year dummies included in the models capture both nationwide trends in partisan affiliation, and election-specific factors (e.g., an anti-incumbency mood) that may influence partisanship similarly in all states. Results for these year dummies confirm a time trend toward greater Republican registration relative to Democratic registration. Motor voter programs of course also show an upward time trend, becoming more widespread over the 1976-94 period.
Thus, in the absence of year dummies, motor voter laws could be spuriously associated with higher Republican registration.
State dummy variables capture time-invariant state-specific influences on the dependent variables. As an example, suppose that the states that were already more Democratic are the ones more likely to adopt motor voter programs during the 1976-94 period, before they were federally mandated. Motor voter, in the absence of state dummies, then would be spuriously associated with higher Democratic registration. State dummies will net out this effect, as well as any other state-specific influences that are unchanging over time, drastically reducing the potential for an upward bias in coefficient estimates for the motor voter variables. With state and year dummies, the regression coefficients reported here depend only on within-state variation over time, and only on the within-state variation over time that is uncorrelated with nationwide time trends. These regressions thus in effect test whether the shares of Democratic, Republican, or unaffiliated registrants changed significantly when motor voter (and mail-in and agency) programs are implemented, controlling for nationwide trends in the relative strength of parties. Gibson et al. (1985) . 9 We thus have no reason to doubt that the findings results we report below for the states registering voters by party are generalizable to the states which do not record party registration.
Our dependent variables are based on party registration data, not party identification. The latter may be more directly related to political behavior, including voting decisions. However, party registration and party identification appear to be very highly correlated across the states.
For the 1992 election, we constructed state-level estimates of party identification (for voters) from exit polling data collected by Voter News Services. For Democrats as a percentage of the total of Democrats and Republicans, the correlation of party registration with party identification of voters was .949 (significant at .0001 for 2-tailed test). Similarly, the percentage of independent registrants was strongly correlated (.84, significant at .0001) with the percentage of exit-poll voters who did not identify with either major party.
For coding the motor voter, mail-in, and agency registration programs 10 of states for each year, various sources were consulted (see Appendix A), particularly Human SERVE, which has long monitored progress in the adoption and implementation of motor voter, mail-in, and agency registration among the states. Appendix B lists the first elections following implementation of motor voter, mail-in, or agency programs for each state in our sample. We create two dichotomous variables to operationalize motor voter programs, with states having no such programs coded 0 for each variable. Following previous studies (e.g., Rhine, 1995; Knack, 1995) , "active" motor voter programs, which more closely approximate the requirements of NVRA, are distinguished from "passive" versions, which are much weaker. Active programs are defined as those in which applicants for driver's licenses are asked, either orally by motor vehicle bureau personnel or via a question on the license application form, if they wish to register to vote.
"Passive" programs typically merely make forms available on countertops, or upon requests initiated by driver's license applicants.
In principle, mail-in programs in effect in various states in the 1976-94 period can also be divided into two groups, those that broadly conformed to the NVRA requirements and those that did not. The most common distinction is in programs that require witnessing or formal authentication of some kind, which Highton and Wolfinger (1995) call "hard mail-in" programs, and those that --as mandated by the NVRA --do not ("easy mail-in"). Unlike "active" vs.
"passive" motor voter, there is little evidence that easy mail-in programs are more effective than hard mail-in programs in registering new voters (e.g., Highton and Wolfinger, 1995; Knack, 1995) . Probably the more important distinction among these programs is how widely the mail-in forms were distributed, for which little information is available. We therefore do not make a distinction between the two here, and code all observations with a mail-in program of either type as mail-in states.
Agency-registration programs in the states can also be classified according to whether they approximate in effectiveness the NVRA provision pertaining to such programs. Only a few agency-registration programs in effect during our 1976-94 sample period offered all applicants for public assistance in the relevant offices the chance to register to vote, as is required by NVRA.
Most programs merely consisted of placing forms on countertops. Given the very small number of "active" agency-registration programs that existed prior to NVRA implementation, we do not attempt to separately test the effects of those that conformed and those that did not. Table 2 reports results of tests of the impact of motor voter, mail-in, and agency programs on Democratic registration as a percentage of the total two-party registration in the 26 states with data. The key NVRA provision, "active" motor voter programs, has no significant impact on this percentage. The "passive" versions of motor voter in effect in many states over the period are associated with a small (1.6 percentage points) but statistically significant reduction in the Democratic percentage. Mail-in programs have no significant effect.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Equation 1 of
Agency programs are associated with a statistically significant increase of about 3.5 percentage points in the Democratic percentage --a sizeable but not overwhelming impact relative to the sample mean of about 61 percent for the Democratic share of the two-party registration totals.
This result is consistent with Earle's post-1994 data on agency registration described above, and is particularly impressive given that most of these programs in our sample period were weaker than the version of agency registration mandated by NVRA. Perhaps Republicans' fear of agency registration is well-founded, at least if the additional registrants bother to show up at the polls on election day. .001) and in concern over which candidate won the presidential election (χ 2 = 186, ρ = .001).
However, we caution that our data do not provide direct tests of whether the young or apathetic are disproportionately advantaged by motor voter programs.
Coefficients for state and year dummy variables are not shown in the Knack (1995) found that the registration and turnout effects of motor voter are cumulative over time and do not all show up in the first election following implementation. This pattern is produced by the fact that a complete driver's license renewal cycle takes up to five years in many states. With each succeeding election, the additional effects diminish, as more and more drivers have had the opportunity to register via motor voter. Equations 2 and 5 of Table 2 test for similar nonlinear effects in partisan registrations, by substituting duration measures for the active motor voter dummy. Duration is measured as the number of elections (including the current one) since implementation of active motor voter. To capture the diminishing marginal effect over time of increasing duration, we use the log of duration in equations 2 and 5 (adding one to each value for duration, so that the log is defined for all observations). As with the dummy variable measure, the duration measure is not significant for the Democratic registration share (equation 2). It is significant in the unaffiliated registrants regression (equation 5), but the empirical fit is slightly better with the dummy variable measure.
Our results indicate that motor voter disproportionately registers independents, while agency registration disproportionately registers Democrats. These basic findings are robust to various alternative specifications for our tests 11 . For example, results differ only trivially if we re-code as "passive" motor voter programs in two states (AZ and WV) that are classified in our tests as "active" but which Human SERVE notes have experienced problems in implementation
12
.
Motor voter may have little impact on participation rates in a state in which registration is already extremely easy. Maine is an active motor voter state which had election-day registration in effect in most election districts, and which often has more names on the registration rolls than there are residents of voting age. Including Maine in our tests therefore could bias the coefficient of motor voter downward. When Maine is deleted, however, results again change very little.
Similarly, a dummy for election-day registration proves insignificant and has virtually no impact on coefficients of the other registration-law or demographic variables.
13
Registration rates are higher in presidential-election years, and may for similar reasons also be higher in states with Senate or gubernatorial races on the ballot. Such surges in registration are sometimes thought to increase the percentage of registrants who are Democratic, or independent.
Dummy variables for presidential years, for Senate races, and for gubernatorial contests were all found to be insignificant when added to our regressions, and did not affect results for the registration-law or demographic variables.
Each of our dependent variables --the percentage of registrants who are Democratic, or independent --is bounded by the values 0% and 100%. We therefore re-ran all regressions using the logistic transformation of each dependent variables (after dividing them by 100), to confine predicted values to the 0-1 interval. Again, results are nearly identical to those reported in Table   2 .
Our basic specification measures only average trends nationwide, and does not allow for differences in time trends across states or regions. For example, the entire secular decline in the Democratic share of registrations could conceivably be attributable entirely to large changes in the South. We accordingly tested for interaction between a time trend variable and a dummy for southern (former Confederate) states. These interaction effects proved to be large and statistically significant. The downward trend in Democratic registrations in the South was more than double that of the rest of the country. The South also exhibited a significant upward trend in independent registrations, while the rest of the country showed no trend. While evidence of differences in trends in party support in the South and non-South is interesting in its own right, the important result for present purposes is that inclusion of these interaction terms had no substantial impact on the coefficients of the registration law variables. Thus, taking into account regional differences in time trends in party registrations does not alter the measured impacts of motor voter, mail-in and agency registration reported in Table 2 .
INCORPORATING DATA FROM 1996
All states had implemented active motor voter, mailin, and agency programs prior to the 1996 elections. Based on the results of the analysis for the 1976-94 period, we would expect to observe increases in the Democratic share of two-party registrations in states with new agency programs, and increases in the unaffiliated share of registrations in states with new motor voter programs.
In equations 3 and 6 of Table 2 , we add observations for 1996 to the sample and re-run the specifications of equations 1 and 4. For 1996, all 
CONCLUSIONS
This is to our knowledge the most rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the partisan impacts of motor voter, mail-in, and agency registration. Unlike the few existing studies of this issue, it controls for state-specific time-invariant influences on partisanship, and for national and regional time trends in partisan affiliation.
We find that the balance of registrants affiliating with the two major parties does not change significantly when motor voter or mail-in programs are adopted. These findings, while consistent with most related research by political scientists, contradict the belief of most politicians that Democrats would be helped, as well as a spate of media reports (e.g., Earle, 1995) claiming that new motor voter registrants were disproportionately Republican.
Agency registration increases by about 3 percentage points the Democratic share of the two-party registration totals, in the states which register voters by party. This effect is especially notable considering that most of the agency programs in place prior to the 1994 election were much weaker than NVRA requirements. Based on this evidence, Republicans' resistance to NVRA --which has been especially fierce with respect to the agency registration provisions of the legislation --was consistent with their electoral self-interest.
We find strong evidence that motor voter programs disproportionately register citizens who indicate no preference for either major party, consistent with the origin of motor voter as a program aimed at registering young people. Anecdotal evidence for states implementing motor voter (and other NVRA provisions) since 1994 points in the same direction: in Kentucky, 25% of all new registrants are listing themselves as independents, compared to about 4% over the 1980-94 period. Oklahoma and Florida reported similarly dramatic increases in independent registrations in 1995 (Greenblatt, 1996; Earle, 1995) .
If motor voter, as anticipated, proves to be the most effective among the NVRA provisions vote --political candidates may in the future alter their campaign strategies in efforts to attract this new and larger pool of independent voters. Candidates may find it advantageous to distance themselves even more from their parties than many of them already do, perhaps in turn weakening the parties even further. If primary elections continue to be determined by partisans, but both partisans and independents participate in general elections, candidates who find it necessary to take conservative or liberal positions to win primaries may be quicker than ever to abandon those positions in attempts to win over an ever-larger pool of independents in the general election campaign. The increase in unaffiliated voters could thereby further undermine trust in politicians.
All of this presumes, however, that candidates expect new registrants to show up at the polls on election day. The failure of the NVRA to prevent a drastic fall in turnout in the 1996 election, coupled with previous research on the participation effects of motor voter (Knack, 1995) , suggests that the turnout effects of motor voter, mail-in, and agency registration may be far more modest than the registration effects. If so, campaign strategies and electoral outcomes are likely to change very little.
10. We do not test the effects of a fourth major provision of motor voter: limiting purging of nonvoters from registration rolls. Our tests depend on within-state variations over time, and relatively few states implemented provisions at all similar to NVRA purging provisions during our sample period.
11. Results reported in the remainder of this section are available on request from the authors.
12. The effectiveness of programs in OH and NJ were also disputed, but they do not register by party and are not included in our sample. Highton and Wolfinger (1995) point out that even under the NVRA there is a possibility of "inept or deliberately awkward implementation" in some states.
Implementation and enforcement was arguably stronger, on average, for the programs tested here --since they were all voluntarily adopted by states --than in similar programs that are adopted solely because of federal mandates.
13. Minnesota is the only election-day registration state other than Maine which simultaneously had an active motor voter program. It is not included in our sample as it does not register voters by party. The only other election-day registration states in our sample include New Hampshire (from 1994) and Oregon (1976-84) . These two states provide the only within-state variation in the election-day dummy in our sample, so it is unsurprising that this variable proves insignificant in our tests.
